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In this paper, we review the debate on ￿new regionalism,￿ focusing on the tools 
used to evaluate regional trade agreements (RTAs). We find that much analysis uses tools 
from old trade theory in the Viner-Meade tradition, focusing on trade creation, trade 
diversion, and terms-of-trade effects. These tools are adequate for the analysis of the 
effects of removing commodity trade barriers (￿shallow￿ integration), but the 
comfortable Viner-Meade framework misses many of the impacts associated with new 
regionalism, which typically involves ￿deep integration,￿ often between developing and 
developed countries. A framework for analyzing new regionalism should include 
dynamic changes such as trade-productivity links and endogenous growth theory, 
international factor mobility, the role of imperfect competition, rent seeking behavior, 
and political-economy considerations such as potential conflicts between regionalism and 
multilateralism. Agriculture poses problems for new regionalism because of high tariffs, 
the use of domestic subsidies and entrenched special interest groups, but the role of trade 
liberalization on its productivity is often overlooked. For developing countries, a crucial 
issue is whether and how regionalism can be part of a successful development strategy. 
While ￿new trade theory￿ is concerned with a number of the issues relevant to new 
regionalism, and is providing new tools, the work is eclectic and is far from providing a 
unified framework for empirical analysis of new regionalism. Both theoretical and 
empirical research is needed to improve the reach and scope of new trade theory applied 
to issues of new regionalism.  ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
1. Introduction.................................................................................................................1  
 
2.  Old and New Regionalism.......................................................................................... 4 
 
3.  Trends in ￿New Regionalism￿.................................................................................... 7 
Diversity of RTAs: From Shallow to Deep Integration.......................................... 7 
New Regionalism and Developed-Developing Country Linkages....................... 11 
 
4.  Old Trade Theory and New Regionalism................................................................. 18 
Theoretical Arguments: Trade Creation, Trade Diversion, and Terms of Trade.. 18 
Empirical Evidence: Trade Creation, Trade Diversion, and Terms of Trade....... 20 
RTAs and Global Liberalization: Complements or Conflicts............................... 23 
 
5.  New Trade Theory and New Regionalism................................................................ 27 
Trade-Productivity Links and Development Strategies........................................ 28 
Trade Productivity Links and Agriculture............................................................ 32 
Imperfect Competition.......................................................................................... 33 
Lobbying and Special Interests............................................................................. 35 
 




Annex: Analytical Tools in the Viner-Meade Framework............................................... 46 
 
 
    
LIST OF TABLE 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1￿RTAs in force by year of entry into force ......................................................... 2 
Figure 2￿Two-thirds of U.S. agricultural imports come from countries with preferential 
agreements, 2002 ............................................................................................. 15 
Figure 3￿Two-thirds of BJ agricultural importance from countries with preferential 






Table 1￿Regional trade agreements currently in force: total number and number with 
developing countries, 2003￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿..￿￿￿.12 
 
 1   
 
 














The world economy after World War II has become much more integrated. Eight 
successive rounds of negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) have resulted in significant global trade liberalization and there has been an 
accelerating trend toward regional integration in every part of the world. Most of the 
early attempts at regional trade agreements (RTAs) in the 1950￿s and 1960￿s, many of 
them among developing countries, met with little success.
5 This ￿first wave￿ of 
regionalism has been eclipsed by the exponential growth in the number of RTAs formed 
over the past 10 years (figure 1). As of May 2003, 184 RTAs were in force. Almost every 
WTO member has now joined at least one RTA and some have entered 20 or more.
 6 The  
                                                 
1 Paper prepared for presentation to The International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (IATRC) 
Conference , Capri, Italy June 2003. The authors would like to thank Mary Bohman, Praveen Dixit, Moataz 
El Said, Mark Gehlhar, and Steven Zahniser for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
2 Mary E. Burfisher is a Senior Economist at the Economic Research Service, USDA. 
3 Sherman Robinson is an Institute Fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute. 
4 Karen Thierfelder is a Professor at the U.S. Naval Academy.  
5 We will use the term ￿regional trade agreement￿ to include preferential trade agreements between 
countries, including those between countries not geographically contiguous or even nearby.  
6 Facts about RTAs are available and regularly updated by the World Trade Organization (WTO) at its web 
site: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm. See also World Trade Organization 
(2002). 2   
most dramatic policy-driven exercise in regional integration has been the establishment 
of the European Common Market in 1958 and its evolution into the European Union 
(EU).  
Figure 1￿RTAs in force by year of entry into force 
 
In the U.S., Special Trade Representative Zoellick has described the U.S. pursuit 
of regionalism as a strategy to achieve short-term economic goals, help break the logjam 
in the multilateral negotiations, and achieve longer term, strategic objectives that can be 
fostered by trade liberalization.
7 The EU has pursued regionalism aggressively as a 
means of encouraging investment and competition, and to reinforce a multipolarity in the 
                                                 
7 The U.S. has also established criteria for deciding which partners to engage in free trade agreements 
(FTAs). These include the size and importance of the economy to the U.S., the country￿s willingness to 
negotiate a comprehensive agreement that includes topics such as intellectual property protections, and 
whether the RTA will help advance WTO or FTAA (Free Trade Agreement of the Americas) negotiations 






































s3   
international system (Lamy, 2001 and 2002). Even Japan, Korea, and China are now 
engaged in regionalism with their first agreements signed at the end of 2002.
8 
These trends have led to a number of questions and research challenges for trade 
economists: 
What are the empirical characteristics of these new RTAs that distinguish them 
from earlier RTAs?  
•  Does the existing body of ￿old￿ trade theory, based largely on the theory of 
comparative advantage, provide an adequate framework for analyzing new 
regionalism? 
•  Does recent work on ￿new￿ trade theory provide a better framework for analyzing 
new regionalism? 
•  What are the major knowledge gaps, both empirical and theoretical, that need to 
be addressed for better analysis of new regionalism?  
 
The objective of this paper is to review the major elements of the economics 
debate on new regionalism. First, we provide a brief overview of the characteristics of old 
and new regionalism. We then describe recent trends in the types of RTAs being formed, 
focusing on delineating the elements of deep integration and the links between developed 
and developing countries that represent the main distinctions between new and old 
regionalism. We also discuss the practical challenges to regional integration, particularly  
                                                 
8 Japan signed an agreement with Singapore in November 2002, and is now negotiating agreements with 
Mexico, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand. China signed its first agreement with ASEAN 
(Association of South East Asian Nations), while Korea￿s first agreement was with Chile.  4   
the inclusion of sensitive sectors like agriculture. We then review the use of old trade 
theory to evaluate new regionalism and empirical work in this tradition. Next, we 
consider studies using new trade theory to analyze new regionalism. We conclude that 
progress in analyzing current and potential RTAs must move beyond the limited 
framework of old trade theory. Finally, we identify some important knowledge gaps, both 
theoretical and empirical, that should be the focus of future work. 
 
2.  OLD AND NEW REGIONALISM 
 
Historically, one can distinguish differing degrees of ￿integration￿ among 
countries, along a continuum from ￿shallow￿ to ￿deep.￿ Shallow integration involves 
only reducing or eliminating barriers to trade in commodities.
9  Deep integration involves 
additional elements of harmonizing national policies, and allowing or encouraging 
internal factor mobility. The first 20 ￿ 30 years after World War II can be seen as a 
period characterized by shallow integration, both globally and, where tried, regionally 
(￿old regionalism￿). With the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, and perhaps earlier 
in some areas, there were strong elements of deeper integration, going beyond 
commodity trade and standard border protection policies. Many RTAs introduced in the 
past 10 ￿ 15 years have involved elements of deeper integration, and many of them have 
linked developing and developed countries the twin characteristics of ￿new regionalism.￿ 
The theoretical analysis of the impact of increased integration and trade 
liberalization has followed the historical trends. International trade theory has a long 
                                                 
9 The notion of ￿commodities￿ is sometimes expanded to include non-factor services.  5   
tradition of analysis of the impact of shallow integration liberalization of barriers to 
commodity trade. This work program has resulted in an elegant and coherent body of 
general equilibrium trade theory that underlies most policy analysis of both global trade 
liberalization and regional integration, with broad consensus in the economics profession 
about the desirability of achieving free trade globally. Under global free trade, countries 
would reallocate factors of production to achieve structures of trade, production, and 
employment of primary factors consistent with their comparative advantage, with welfare 
gains arising from increased efficiency. There is a large body of theoretical and empirical 
work in this tradition, working within what is commonly called the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson (HOS) theoretical framework.  
Theoretical analysis of shallow regional trade agreements old regionalism is more 
complex, because it is inherently an exercise in ￿second best￿ analysis. Some distortions 
are eliminated (tariffs on trade within the RTA), while others remain (e.g., other within-
RTA domestic tax/subsidy policies and tariffs on non-RTA trade). The core theoretical 
analysis of shallow RTAs is the theory of customs unions, with seminal contributions by 
Viner (1950), Meade (1955), and Kemp and Wan (1976).
10  In this framework, which 
adheres closely to the standard general equilibrium trade theory in the HOS framework, 
the welfare impact of an RTA is determined by a few crucial variables: changes in 
commodity trade in the countries within the RTA (￿trade creation￿ effects), changes in 
trade between the RTA and the rest of the world (￿trade diversion￿ effects), and changes 
in international prices facing the countries (￿terms-of-trade￿ effects). In general, trade  
                                                 
10 For a recent survey of theoretical work largely in the Viner-Meade framework, see Panagaryia (2000). 6   
creation and terms-of-trade gains are welfare enhancing, and trade diversion and terms-
of-trade losses are potentially damaging. Given the second-best environment, it is 
impossible to draw strong general conclusions about the desirability of forming an RTA 
from the perspective either of members or of the rest of the world, from theory alone. 
There are tradeoffs, and empirical work is required to make any welfare judgments in 
particular cases.  
While there is a general view that there are elements, in addition to resource 
reallocation, that are an important part of the story in new regionalism, there is still 
widespread use of old trade theory to analyze RTAs, focusing only on trade creation, 
trade diversion, and terms-of-trade changes. The HOS and Viner-Meade frameworks are 
well established, representing a kind of conventional wisdom and coherent theoretical 
structure that is comfortable to use, even though it is widely understood that this 
framework misses much of the action in the new regionalism.
11  
Along with the emergence of deeper integration both globally and regionally, and 
the reliance on RTAs by developing countries, there is now emerging a body of ￿new 
trade theory￿ that has sought to incorporate the impact of forces that go beyond efficiency 
gains from reallocating resources according to comparative advantage. This work has 
been stimulated in part by the observation that, while efficiency gains from various 
regional schemes are significant, they are small in relation to national product and appear  
                                                 
11 In two recent examples, Galal and Lawrence (2003) analyze the potential Morocco-U.S. and Egypt-U.S. 
free trade areas, and Leith and Whalley (2003) consider a potential South Africa-U.S. free trade area. Both 
studies discuss issues of deep integration and note that their effects may be large, but focus their empirical 
analysis on issues of trade creation and trade diversion, acknowledging the difficulty of measuring the 
effects of deep integration. Both papers work within the framework of old trade theory, with little reference 
to any theoretical work in new trade theory.  7   
to be much too small to explain the rapid economic growth that has accompanied trade 
expansion in many countries. This body of work is much more eclectic and less coherent 
than work in the HOS and Viner-Meade frameworks, although there are certainly many 
examples of ￿elegant￿ models in new trade theory. There are partial and general 
equilibrium models incorporating a variety of new elements, including, for example, rent 
seeking, political economy, game theory, industrial organization (especially imperfect 
competition), geography, open-economy macroeconomics, and new growth theory. An 
important strand of this research agenda analyzes the links between international trade 
and total factor productivity, which provides additional sources of growth and welfare 
gains from expanded trade. There is an active literature seeking to understand the links 
between productivity and trade, especially in an environment with various elements of 
deep integration, and to measure their quantitative importance.  
 
 
3.  TRENDS IN ￿NEW REGIONALISM￿ 
 
 
DIVERSITY OF RTAs: FROM SHALLOW TO DEEP INTEGRATION  
 
￿Regional trade agreement￿ is a general term that refers to a whole spectrum of 
levels of economic integration. The lowest level of integration is represented by trade 
preferences, or partial scope agreements, which liberalize trade in specific commodities 
or sectors. This type of agreement, with its selective liberalization, does not conform to 8   
GATT/WTO rules on RTAs, which under Article 24 require that preferential 
arrangements for trade in goods meet two criteria:
12 
•  ￿substantially all trade￿ must be included, and 
 
•  the ￿general incidence of duties and other regulations of commerce￿ must not 
on the whole be higher or more restrictive against third parties than before the 
formation of the RTA.  
The reasoning behind the requirement for substantial inclusion is to prevent 
members from taking a mercantilist approach to liberalization, and including only those 
sectors in which they anticipate export growth. Such agreements would likely be crafted 
to carve export growth out of non-members￿ market shares, and hence be essentially 
protectionist and trade-diverting in character.
13  
The most common type of RTA is a free trade area in which members liberalize 
internal trade but retain their independent external tariffs. Seventy percent of the RTAs 
that have been notified to the WTO, are free trade agreements. Examples of free trade 
agreements include NAFTA, and U.S. agreements with Israel, Jordan, Singapore, and 
Chile. Since free trade agreements allow members to retain different tariffs against the  
                                                 
12 RTAs are also covered by GATT Article 5, which governs the preferential liberalization of services, and 
by the 1979 Enabling Clause, which governs trade in goods among developing countries. Of the 184 RTAs 
notified to the WTO as of May 2003, 25 RTAs were notified under Article 5 and 19 were notified under the 
Enabling Clause. 
13 Bhagwati (1990) argues that there were other reasons for the GATT adoption of a standard of 100 
percent preferences. This approach creates a single-nation characteristic and a quasi-national status to the 
RTA that can legitimate the exception to the MFN principal. Such a difficult standard may also have been 
expected to act as a deterrent to an eruption of bilateral arrangements like those that created protectionism 
in the inter-war period. Finally, this standard may have been used to define regionalism as a supplement to, 
rather than a substitute for, multilateralism by establishing as a standard the ultimate goal of the GATT ￿ 
free trade. 9   
rest of the world, they must include detailed rules of origin (ROOs). ROOs prevent goods 
that enter the member country with the lower external tariff from being transshipped duty 
free to members with higher tariffs. ROOs require that some proportion of products 
traded within the free trade area be of domestic content. ROOs can become complex 
because they can specify domestic content thresholds on a commodity basis and can in 
themselves become a focus of market access negotiations. 
The GATT/WTO does not place any discipline on the rules of origin used in free 
trade areas. These are being increasingly recognized as an insidious form of trade 
protection. By increasing the domestic content requirement, ROOs can increase demand 
for local inputs, and divert trade from lower-cost, non-member suppliers. Krueger (1995) 
has argued that special interest pressures on the content requirements in ROOs gives 
them the potential to be used as non-tariff barriers on imported intermediates, causing 
them to become an important but hidden source of trade diversion in RTAs.
14  
Customs unions liberalize internal trade and its members adopt common external 
tariffs against the rest of the world, eliminating the need for ROOs. About 8 percent of 
the RTAs currently in force are customs unions, including MERCOSUR, the Andean 
Pact, and the Central American Common Market (CACM). This is the type of RTA at 
which the second criteria of GATT article 24 is aimed. The prohibition against RTA￿s 
raising their common external tariff is, like the first criteria, an attempt to minimize trade 
diversion. Low external tariffs reduce the margin of preference offered to pact members, 
                                                 
14 Analysis of trade data seems to support the negative views on ROOs. In a review of textile trade in 
NAFTA, Burfisher et al. (2001) and James and Umemoto (1999) both found strong evidence that NAFTA 
ROOs led to trade diversion. In the EU, Brenton and Manchin (2003) found a low level of utilization of EU 
trade preferences, which they attributed to ROOs. 10   
and therefore the price incentives that lead to trade diversion. Kemp and Wan (1976) 
showed that it is possible to eliminate trade diversion entirely if a customs union adopts a 
sufficiently low set of common external tariffs at the same time that they liberalize 
internal trade.
15 
In a common market, members move beyond a customs union, and beyond 
shallow integration or commodity trade reforms, to allow the free movement of labor and 
capital within the union. The European Economic Community (EEC) by the early 1990￿s 
had achieved a common market. With the decision to become the European Union, in 
which members adopted compatible fiscal and monetary policies, and (many) a common 
currency (the Euro), the Europeans are achieving full economic or deep integration, or an 
economic union.  
New regionalism can be characterized as involving many of the elements found in 
the deepest level of integration, or the achievement of full economic (and monetary) 
union, and may include (in rough order of increasing depth):  
•  facilitating financial and foreign direct investment flows (real and financial 
capital mobility) by establishing investment protocols and protections;  
•  liberalizing movement of labor within the RTA;  
                                                 
15 MERCOSUR is an example of an RTA that simultaneously lowered its external tariffs when internal 
trade barriers were removed. Analyses of MERCOSUR related to agriculture show that the RTA therefore 
created trade for both members and nonmembers (Gelhar (1998), Zahniser et al. (2002)). Yeats (1998) 
found that MERCOSUR is net trade-diverting. However, his analysis is based on a partial-equilibrium 
study of individual sectors, excluding agriculture, and so cannot yield conclusions on the aggregate impact 
of the RTA, which requires an economywide analysis. Using a CGE framework, Robinson et al. (1998) 
found MERCOSUR to be net trade-creating and welfare enhancing.  11   
•  harmonizing domestic tax and subsidy policies, especially those that affect 
production and trade incentives;  
•  harmonizing macro policies, including fiscal and monetary policy, to achieve 
a stable macroeconomic environment within the RTA, including coordinated 
exchange rate policy; 
•  establishing institutions to manage and facilitate integration (e.g., regional 
development funds, institutions to set standards, dispute resolution 
mechanisms);  
•  improvements of communications and transportation infrastructure to 
facilitate increased trade and factor mobility;  
•  harmonizing legal regulation of product and factor markets (e.g., anti-trust 
law, commercial law, labor relations, financial institutions); and  
•  monetary union establishment of a common currency and completely 
integrated monetary and exchange rate policy.  
 
NEW REGIONALISM AND DEVELOPED-DEVELOPING COUNTRY LINKAGES 
 
New regionalism is also characterized by the linkages that recent RTAs have 
created between developing countries and one or more large, developed country partners 
(table 1). Such RTAs have been important for the United States, Canada and the EU, but 
not for Japan, Australia or New Zealand. Of the four RTAs in which the United States 
participates (currently in force and notified to the WTO), 3 are with developing countries: 
NAFTA (Mexico), Chile and Jordan. The EU has used RTAs as a key part of its strategy 
for economic development assistance. Thirty-five of its 50 RTAs are with developing 12   
country partners, some of which include Eastern European partners who have now 
graduated to EU membership. Especially when considering the impact of an RTA on 
developing countries, an important issue in new regionalism, elements of deep integration 
with developed countries are considered to be crucial in achieving potential links between 
increased trade and improvements in productivity. The nature of such links, and questions 
about how different elements of deep integration facilitate or hinder them, are a central 
part of much new trade theory. 
 
Non-reciprocal preferences are agreements between developed and developing 
countries that typically allow for low or duty-free access for developing-country exports. 
Although not considered to be RTAs because they are not mutual, they deserve mention 
for two reasons. First, they are the most geographically comprehensive type of tariff 
preference in world trade. They include the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 
Table 1￿Regional trade agreements currently in force: total number and number 
with developing countries, 2003 
 
 
Number of regional trade agreements  Country or region 




formed since 1989 
United States  4  3  3 
European  Union 50 35  31 
Canada 5  4  4 
Japan 2  0  0 
Australia and New Zealand  4  0  0 
European Free Trade Area  24  21  17 
Agreements between developing 
country partners  
76 76  68 
Other 19  Na  Na 
Total 184  139  123 
 
Note:  NAFTA is included for both the U.S. and Canada.  
Source:  Based on data downloaded on May 21, 2003 from:  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm.  
 13   
offered by developed countries to almost all developing countries. In addition, there are 
special non-reciprocal preference programs such as the U.S. Caribbean Basin Economic 
Recovery Act (CBERA) and Andean preferences; the EU Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific 
(ACP) Partnership, the Cotonou Agreement, and the ￿Everything But Arms￿ initiative. A 
disadvantage of these schemes compared to RTAs is that they generally require renewal 
and they can expire, which happened in the U.S. during the recent debate in Congress on 
granting the president Trade Promotion Authority.  
Non-reciprocal preferences are also relevant to the regionalism debate because 
their value to developing countries is reduced by regional integration, which can erode 
margins of preference within the union. This outcome has spurred debate about the costs 
to some developing countries of advancing from existing non-reciprocal preferences to 
regional trade agreements with developed countries, as in the proposed FTAA, for 
example. On one hand, developing countries will lose any benefits accrued in its favor 
due to the trade-diverting effects of the non-reciprocal preferences. On the other hand, 
such preferences are increasingly viewed as having offered few real benefits to 
developing countries. They often exclude the products of greatest export interest, such as 
sugar and dairy products. For example, Brown (1989) finds that exclusions of important 
export sectors of developing countries from preferences diminish the potential gains from 
preferences. Furthermore, they may actually slow economic development by reinforcing 
traditional or low-productivity sectors. Panagariya (2002) argues that EU preferences 
essentially transfer rents and undermine reforms that could promote faster growth. Lamy 
(2002) argues that non-reciprocal preferences lead to clustering of economic activity in 
traditional activities and slows industrialization. Because of this, the EU now plans to 14   




SENSITIVE SECTORS AND RTAS: PROBLEMS POSED BY AGRICULTURE 
 
Despite the GATT/WTO requirement that RTAs liberalize substantially all trade, 
full trade liberalization remains the exception rather than the rule. One reason this has 
been possible is the ambiguity of Article 24 criteria, which makes it difficult to determine 
whether RTAs are in compliance with the GATT/WTO. Whether the criteria refer to 
tariff lines or the value of current or potential trade, and what the threshold is for 
￿substantial have not been determined.
16 
While the legal definitions remain unresolved, in practice, recent trade agreements 
have more extensive product coverage than previous agreements. Of the agreements in 
force in 1998, a recent WTO examination found that 43 percent had 100 percent coverage 
of industrial goods compared to 11 percent in the 1990 period, although few have 100 
percent coverage. Agriculture continues to pose the greatest obstacle to comprehensive 
RTA coverage. Generally, RTAs￿ inclusion of agriculture has been more limited than of 
industry, although it is has been addressed more comprehensively in recent RTAs  than in 
earlier agreements.  
 
                                                 
16 Two measures of trade coverage are now being debated at the WTO to clarify the definition of 
substantially all trade. One is qualitative coverage, which would require that every major sector be included 
in trade liberalization. The alternative is a quantitative benchmark that would require that a certain 
percentage of trade be covered. The measurement of this benchmark might be the share of total trade, the 
share of bilateral trade, or a share of tariff lines. 15   
Figure 2￿Two-thirds of U.S. agricultural imports come from countries with 










Economic Research Service, USDA.  
Agriculture poses two challenges for regional agreements. First, tariffs in 
agriculture remain very high, despite the progress made in the Uruguay Round. These 
high tariffs signal the presence of effective special interest groups that have been able to 
forestall trade reform at both the global and the regional levels. Both the U.S. and the EU 
already allow preferential access to most of their agricultural trade partners: for both, 
about two-thirds of their agricultural imports come from countries benefiting from their 
trade preferences (figures 2 and 3). However, the value of the preferences is diminished 
by their exclusion of many agricultural commodities and related food products linked to 
their domestic support programs.
17 
                                                 
17 Crawford and Laird provide a general overview of the treatment of agriculture in RTAs notified to the 
WTO. Sheffield (1998) reviews the treatment of agriculture in major RTAs and finds that most include 
agriculture in trade liberalization. Estevadeordal reviews the treatment of agriculture in Western 
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Figure 3￿Two-thirds of BJ agricultural importance from countries with 
preferential agreements, 1998-2000  
 
 
Source: Hasha, 2001 
The EU￿s RTAs (with non-CAP members) exclude those agricultural 
commodities that receive domestic support under the CAP (Hasha, 2001). Similarly, U.S. 
GSP and other developing country preferences exclude commodities linked to U.S. 
domestic support programs, including processed food products such as confections with 
sugar and dairy content (Burfisher, Robinson and Thierfelder, 2002). 
Second, some agricultural policies are essentially global in character, and are not 
amenable to regional reform. Domestic production subsidies, for example, have a global, 
rather than regional impact. In the FTAA, the U.S. has therefore argued that their 
negotiation in a regional forum would reduce needed U.S. leverage on their negotiation in 
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solution. While an RTA can discipline the use of export subsidies within a region, 
subsidies by third countries into the region would be difficult to monitor and the creation 
of regional compensation mechanisms to protect regional exporters would be a challenge.  
One way that RTAs can resolve such incompatibilities in members￿ domestic 
support or export subsidies is to harmonize or to adopt common policies, as the EU has 
done internally in its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Another is to provide long 
transition periods for certain commodities. In one of the only comparative empirical 
analyses of tariff phase-out periods, Estevadeordal (2002) studied the phase-out paths of 
trade agreements in the Western Hemisphere. He found that over 50 percent of products 
become duty-free in the first year of the RTAs￿ implementation, and only about 5 percent 
of trade is exempted. However, the phase-out periods differ significantly on a sectoral 
basis, with agriculture generally having the most gradual liberalization path. 
WTO members intend to address some of the deficiencies of the GATT/WTO 
disciplines on RTAs in the Doha Development Agenda. The Doha Declaration￿s Article 
29 states that ￿We also agree to negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving 
disciplines and procedures applying to regional trade agreements.￿
18 When these issues 
are resolved, there will be stronger global trade rules that reinforce the benefits and 
constrain the protectionist character of RTAS. Ultimately, the most effective discipline 
on RTAs will be the continued pace of trade liberalization in the WTO. Further 
reductions in MFN tariffs will reduction of margins of preference available through 
                                                 
18 Article 29 in addition states that ￿ (T)he negotiations shall take into account the developmental aspects of 
regional trade agreements.￿  18   
RTAs, and stronger enforcement and dispute resolution mechanisms can help ensure fair 
trade despite the essentially uncompetitive nature of preferential tariffs in world markets.  
 
4.    OLD TRADE THEORY AND NEW REGIONALISM 
 
 
THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS: TRADE CREATION, TRADE DIVERSION, AND 
TERMS OF TRADE 
 
 
There is a large literature using old trade theory to analyze the impact of RTAs in 
the Viner-Meade framework. In Annex 1, we review the key points of this framework, 
particularly how models in this tradition consider trade creation, trade diversion, and 
terms-of-trade effects. While some work in this tradition attempts to extend the Viner-
Meade framework to capture some elements of new regionalism, all of it is characterized 
by its focus on trade creation, trade diversion, and prices, and by its neglect of potential 
trade-productivity links and other essential elements of new trade theory.
19  
Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), (also Panagariya 1996, 1999) oppose RTAs 
because of their trade diverting effects. Instead, they advocate multilateral reform. Their 
theoretical arguments rely on a special case in which an RTA is specified as purely trade 
diverting.
20 In this case, which they call the ￿small union,￿ the home country has no 
domestic production of the traded good (hence, no possibility of trade creation), and the 
RTA partner cannot supply all of the imports demanded. Some imports continue to come  
                                                 
19 Old trade theory tools were appropriate to analyze old regionalism. For example, the RTAs in Latin 
America in the 1960s failed because trade diversion effects dominated, as theory predicted. 
20 Others dismiss this case because it is not realistic. For example, de Melo et al. (1993) note that the case 
of pure trade diversion while unambiguously welfare-worsening, is too extreme a model to characterize 
actual RTAs. For a recent discussion of the theory with models that allow both trade creation and trade 
diversion, see Winters (1996) and DeRosa (1998). 19   
from the non-RTA partner, which is a large country and the price setter. By construction, 
there can be only a welfare loss as consumers in the importing country do not benefit 
from a lower import price and lose the tariff revenue on imports from the RTA partner. 
The larger the initial trade shares with the RTA partner, the greater the welfare loss 
associated with the tariff revenue transfer. They also refer to this as a terms-of-trade loss 
because the importing country moves up the export supply curve of its RTA partner, 
worsening its terms of trade with the RTA partner (see discussion in the annex). 
One of the implications of their terms-of-trade argument is that RTAs such as 
NAFTA will be particularly harmful to undiversified partners such as Mexico. For 
example, Panagariya (1997) does a back-of-the-envelope calculation, estimating welfare 
losses as high as $3.26 billion for Mexico from NAFTA, looking only at tariff losses.
21 In 
contrast, Brown (1993) argues from the same initial conditions for Mexico high trade 
shares with the United States and high tariffs but finds that little trade can be diverted 
from the rest of the world due to NAFTA. The difference between the two approaches is 
the underlying assumption about the analytical model. Brown presumes both trade 
creation and trade diversion are possible, while Panagariya￿s model allows only for trade 
diversion. 
The general conclusion of the theoretical literature in the Viner-Meade framework 
is that whether an RTA is welfare-increasing is essentially an empirical question that  
                                                 
21 Similarly, Panagariya (1996) projects losses for Latin America in a Free Trade Agreement of the 
Americas (FTAA). Since Latin American countries have higher tariffs than the USA, they will lose tariff 
revenue when they enter an FTAA.This is, of course, a theoretical argument and its empirical validity 
depends on the size of the effects. In the case of NAFTA, there is no empirical evidence that these tariff-
diversion effects have been empirically important. See Burfisher et al. (2001).  20   
must be settled by examination of data specific to each RTA under consideration. The 
various theoretical models point to potentially important effects and causal channels, but 
no general conclusions can be drawn from theory alone.  
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: TRADE CREATION, TRADE DIVERSION, AND TERMS 
OF TRADE  
 
 
Although both trade volume and terms-of-trade effects determine the welfare 
impacts of RTAs in the Viner-Meade framework, empirically, it has been easier, ex 
poste, to analyze trade creation and diversion, which can be measured with data on trade 
volumes, than to analyze terms-of-trade effects, which require price data. In a recent, 
comprehensive review of trade flows, Crawford and Laird (2001) analyze trade data from 
six regional trade agreements (APEC, MECOSUR, NAFTA, the EU, the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Andean Community). They find that, 
between1990 and 1999, trade within these pacts increased an average 7.1 percent 
annually, compared to the average annual growth in each pact￿s imports from non-
members of 6 percent annually. In the case of the EU, imports from members and 
nonmembers grew at the same rate. The high overall growth in the RTAs￿ imports may 
reflect the effects of liberalization on their economic growth and demand, and suggests 
that the RTAs have been net trade creating for both members and nonmembers. 
The challenge, however, is to identify the impact that RTA policies have had in 
accounting for these trade flows. Gravity models are becoming an important tool for such 
analysis because they can be used to econometrically estimate the relationship between 
trade and a policy shock. But these models are also criticized because of their weak 21   
theoretical foundation, and because the estimated coefficients for the trade-agreement 
variables may capture the influence of unrelated developments that are contemporaneous 
to these accords.
22 The growing body of research utilizing these models is not yielding a 
consensus view on RTAs￿ trade impacts. Frankel et al. (1996) analyze trade among 63 
countries between 1965 and 1992, finding intra-bloc trade biases that are statistically 
significant, with mixed impacts of trade creation and trade diversion with nonmembers. 
Soloaga and Winters (1999) find no evidence of increased intra-bloc trade during 1980-
96, although in Latin America, they found RTAs had a positive impact on the imports of 
bloc members. In agriculture, Zahniser et al. (2002) estimate a modified gravity model 
that controls for the importing country￿s long-term bilateral trading relationships and 
allows the impacts of an RTA to vary from one participant to another. They estimate the 
impacts of Western Hemisphere RTAs on U.S. agricultural exports; in contrast, the other 
gravity models discussed here analyzed total trade. They find that NAFTA had a positive 
and significant impact on Mexico￿s trade. Mexico￿s unilateral reforms accounted for 39 
percent of U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico during 1989-93, while the reforms and 
NAFTA together account for 59 percent of this trade during 1994-99.  
Multi-country computable general equilibrium (CGE) models include the price 
analysis necessary to evaluate terms-of-trade effects. In these models, commodities are 
differentiated by country of origin. The effects of an RTA on the demand for non-
member goods depends on the elasticity of substitution between member and non-
member country goods. CGE models allow controlled simulations of the effects of trade 
                                                 
22 See Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) for a recent discussion of the theoretical weakness of gravity 
models. 22   
reforms on endogenous prices and quantities relative to some benchmark base year. 
Burfisher and Jones (1998) survey the results of CGE-based case studies related to 
agriculture, including analyses of NAFTA, Western Hemisphere integration, EU 
expansion and APEC. These studies report changes in the U.S. agricultural terms of 
trade, which improve in the short run for all RTAs except for the EU. The inclusion of 
both terms-of-trade effects and trade changes allow CGE models to generate welfare 
outcomes. The RTAs surveyed by Burfisher and Jones were all welfare-increasing for 
members and the world, but not for the U.S. when it is a non-member.  
Schiff and Winters (2003) critique the use of CGE models to draw ex poste 
conclusions because the models are used for counterfactual simulations, not forecasts, 
and because of their typically ad hoc estimates of behavioral and trade/productivity 
parameters. The counterargument is that: (1) sensitivity analysis indicates that the broad 
conclusions are robust to reasonable variation in parameter estimates, and (2) that CGE 
models provide the most appropriate tool for examining the impact of trade liberalization 
on world prices, trade, and welfare in the Viner-Meade framework. These empirical 
models have become a work-horse of policy analyses because of their capacity to capture 
bilateral trade flows, input-output relationships, factor market effects, price and quantity 
changes, and welfare impacts￿all within a framework that has a consistent foundation in 
microeconomics and trade theory. 
Schiff and Winters (2003) also argue that CGE models overstate the terms-of-
trade benefits to RTA members because the models use the assumption that products are 
differentiated by country of origin, giving each country some degree of market power. 
This characterization is incorrect because it focuses only on the terms-of-trade gains 23   
members experience at the expense of non-members. One needs to consider the changes 
in both intra-union terms of trade and terms of trade with the non-union countries, which 
are both captured in CGE models.  
The applied literature on the estimated welfare impacts of regionalism is large and 
growing, and for the most part supports a consensus view that RTAs have been net trade-
creating and world welfare-improving. Baldwin and Venables￿ (1995) review of the 
empirical literature found generally positive impacts on the living standards of RTA 
members and negligible impacts on nonmembers. Robinson and Thierfelder (2002) 
review the CGE-based literature and conclude that there are robust conclusions from the 
many existing studies of RTAs: (1) they increase welfare of participants, (2) aggregate 
trade creation is much larger than trade diversion, (3) positive welfare effects are even 
larger if features of new trade theory are considered, and (4) there are additional welfare 
gains from expanding membership.  
 
RTAs AND GLOBAL LIBERALIZATION: COMPLEMENTS OR CONFLICTS 
 
Bhagwati￿s (1990) characterization of regional trade agreements as ￿building 
blocs or stumbling blocs￿ for multilateralism is part of an ongoing debate on whether new 
regionalism helps or hurts prospects for continuing global liberalization.
23 In addition to 
RTAs￿ static trade and welfare impacts, their effects on the multilateral negotiations then 
taking place in the Uruguay Round became an important criteria for evaluating the net  
                                                 
23 See, for example, Bergsten (1997), who is an eloquent proponent of the notion of open regionalism, and 
Bond, Syropoulos, and Winters (2001), who consider issues of deep regional integration and multilateral 
liberalization.  24   
benefits of an RTA. In Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), building blocs were defined as 
RTAs that either prompt an acceleration in multilateral negotiations (by going further and 
faster than multilateralism, and creating successful experience with reform), or which add 
new members until the bloc converges on global free trade. Stumbling blocs are the 
opposite: they create or entrench trade diversion and protectionism, and are closed to 
expansion.  
Much of the literature on RTAs as building or stumbling blocs is theoretical and 
stays in the Viner-Meade framework. One way an RTA can act as a stumbling bloc is by 
creating incentives for its members to raise their external tariffs against nonmembers, 
thereby increasing the overall level of protection in world markets. Although this is not 
allowed by GATT/WTO Article 24, it is at least conceivable that developing countries 
whose applied rates are well below bound rates could exercise this option since WTO 
rules allow countries to increase their tariffs up to their bound rates. If RTAs lock in 
bilateral rates, then any policy responses to protectionist pressures must fall on outside 
countries. Panagariya (1996) argued that this dynamic was evidenced during Mexico￿s 
peso crisis, although most observers of NAFTA have concluded that the opposite 
occurred.
24  Since about 90 percent of Mexico￿s trade is with the U.S., NAFTA 
effectively prevented Mexico from a pursuing a protectionist response to the foreign 
exchange crisis, and helped Mexican policy makers to pursue a successful macro 
stabilization program. NAFTA, by locking in Mexico￿s policy reforms of the 1980￿s, was 
                                                 
24 Panagariya pointed to Mexico￿s response to its peso crisis, when it increased tariffs on non-NAFTA 
countries on 502 products by 35 percent, about a 75 percent increase. Bhagwati (1993) has made a similar 
point, arguing that countries entering a FTA will tend to increase their use of non-tariff measures such as 
anti-dumping and countervailing duty actions against third countries as weaker industries struggle to 
survive regional free trade. 25   
widely considered to have been a major factor in maintaining investor confidence and 
initiating a macro recovery.
25 
Krugman (1991) explains the incentive small countries have to form an RTA that 
lets them exert market power, as a group, and benefit from a higher external tariff. This 
analysis uses the old trade theory tools from the Viner-Meade framework, particularly the 
terms-of-trade effects of an RTA on non-members. Krugman finds that the welfare-
minimizing number of blocs is three, when tariffs are set non-cooperatively.
26 Because 
the formation of a trade bloc creates trade among its members, the bloc now has more 
market power than that wielded by its individual members and therefore a greater 
incentive to levy higher tariffs and manipulate its terms of trade.
27 Krugman describes a 
U-shape to world welfare according to the number of trade blocs. When there are many 
small blocs, they will set low external tariffs due to their limited market power. As the 
number of blocs diminishes, they will seek their optimal tariff and set their tariffs high, 
tending to increase trade diversion relative to trade creation. When there is only one bloc, 
the world has achieved free trade on a multilateral basis, and trade diversion is 
eliminated.  
While terms-of-trade issues have an important place in theoretical models, there is 
general agreement that large countries or blocs in fact do not appear to be motivated by  
                                                 
25 See, for example, De Long, De Long, and Robinson (1999).  
26 Krugman (1993) later argued that the current multilateral system is one in which tariffs are set 
cooperatively. Countries are therefore likely to believe that they have more to lose from the collapse of a 
cooperative global system than they can gain from non-cooperative trade policies that exploit their market 
power. 
27 Krugman (1993) later argued that trade diversion is likely to dominate trade creation even without an 
increase in a trade bloc￿s external tariff, an argument that rests on the restrictive assumption of a very high 
elasticity of substitution between regional and extra-regional goods. 26   
the exercise of market power, nor are they observed to be raising tariffs. More likely, they 
are motivated by social welfare goals or interest-group satisfaction as described by 
Bhagwati and Panagariya￿s stumbling bloc theory. Krugman describes this as ￿GATT-
think￿ in which countries are mainly acting to maximize exports, minimize imports, and 
trade off some import growth for export gains. Domestic producer interests dominate 
perhaps due to Olsen-type lobbying and collective action.  
In our view, the continuing reliance on old trade theory in the Viner-Meade 
framework to analyze the impact of new regionalism is not very useful and distracts 
attention from important issues related to these new RTAs. First, while old trade theory 
concludes that FTAs ￿may￿ reduce welfare, the empirical work in the narrow Viner-
Meade framework indicates that RTAs are generally good for their members that they are 
not seriously detrimental to nonmembers, and that global liberalization is always better. 
With few exceptions, there is no convincing empirical evidence that trade diversion 
dominates in the RTAs considered. These results support the ￿open regionalism￿ view of 
RTAs, in which their continued expansion supports an evolution toward global 
liberalization. A second robust conclusion from empirical work in this tradition, however, 
is that the potential benefits of trade liberalization in general, and RTAs in particular, are 
rather small as shares, say, of national product neoclassical efficiency gains tend to yield 
triangles, not rectangles. Certainly, the dramatic increases in world trade in the past 50 
years, and the apparent large benefits arising from that increased trade, do not seem to be 
captured in standard neoclassical trade models. More is needed and it is time to move 
beyond the static HOS and Viner-Meade frameworks.  
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5.  NEW TRADE THEORY AND NEW REGIONALISM 
 
While old trade theory focuses on commodity trade and prices, new trade theory 
considers a variety of other effects of trade and mechanisms other than more efficient 
sectoral allocation of factors of production. New trade theory considers trade-productivity 
links (i.e. ￿new growth theory￿), imperfect competition, and rent-seeking behavior, 
especially in considering the issue of regionalism versus multilateralism. Characteristics 
of new regionalism suggest that their welfare impacts cannot be fully explained using old 
trade theory. Features of new regionalism that have been prominent in recent literature 
include:  
•  technology and knowledge transfers, and technology diffusion, especially 
from developed countries to developing countries, that increase productivity, 
•  dynamic comparative advantage and ￿learning by doing￿ efficiency gains 
through increased demand from expanded trade, 
•  elimination of wasteful rent seeking activities through trade liberalization, 
•  pro-competitive gains from increasing import competition in an environment 
of imperfect competition, allowing exploitation of potential economies of 
scale in production, 
•  increased geographical dispersion of production through trade that supports 
(1) exploitation of different factor proportions for parts of the production 
process (Ricardian efficiency gains) and/or (2) local economies of scale 
through finer specialization and division of labor in production (Smithian 
efficiency gains).  28   
•  increased foreign direct investment that carries with it advanced technologies 
and hence increases in productivity, 
•  ￿challenge-response￿ increases in efficiency through increased competition 
due to expanded involvement in world markets, and 
•  Schumpeterian innovation and ￿creative destruction￿ induced by increased 
competition arising from expanded trade.  
We review three of these features below: trade-productivity links, imperfect 
competition, and rent-seeking behavior.  
 
TRADE-PRODUCTIVITY LINKS AND DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
 
New regionalism provides a broad context to explain the motivations of 
developing countries to engage in regionalism As Ethier (1998a and 1998b) notes, recent 
RTAs typically involve more than commodity trade liberalization. His ￿stylized facts￿ of 
new regionalism are:  
•  recent RTAs typically feature one or more developing countries linking up 
with a developed country for example, the union of Mexico with the U.S. and 
Canada in NAFTA;  
•  membership in an RTA often follows significant unilateral liberalization by 
developing countries, including both trade and macro policy reforms for 
example, the unilateral reforms by the Central European countries and Mexico 
that preceded their respective unions with Western Europe and NAFTA; 29   
•  RTAs seldom address only trade barriers in fact, the degree of trade 
liberalization may be modest and they invariably incorporate elements of deep 
economic integration; and 
•  developing countries make bigger trade concessions in RTAs; often because 
the developed countries have low tariffs to begin with.  
 
Ethier￿s focus on the role of new regionalism in achieving deep integration 
between developed and developing countries highlights their role as part of an 
appropriate ￿development strategy￿ for the poorer countries.
28 There is a fairly broad, but 
not universal, consensus that expanded trade is an important part of a successful 
development strategy. There is also a consensus that trade liberalization is not sufficient 
to achieve improved performance, including rapid growth and elimination of poverty.  
Developing countries hope that their internal reforms will attract foreign direct 
investment (FDI) from developed countries (￿investment creation￿), which carries with it 
the prospect for the transfer of global technology and increased productivity. The payoff 
of the RTA through FDI and the resulting unskilled wage gains must be great enough to 
overcome resistance from special interest groups. The potential FDI may even be large 
enough to induce countries to attempt reform that otherwise would not do so a ￿reform 
creation￿ effect of an RTA.  
Within the framework of new regionalism, developing countries form an RTA 
with a developed country to compete with nonmembers for the developed partner￿s FDI. 
                                                 
28 See Schiff and Winters (2003) for a more detailed discussion of whether and how RTAs support 
economic development. They have an extensive discussion of the characteristics of new regionalism, 
especially as they relate to developing countries.  30   
Ethier argues that the effect of this ￿investment diversion￿ is likely to increase the resolve 
of outsiders to reform themselves, acting as a positive force behind reform creation, in his 
view the major benefit of new regionalism.  
The role of FDI and productivity growth in Ethier￿s framework incorporates the 
endogenous growth theory that has become embedded in recent empirical work on RTAs. 
Typically, trade is assumed to have a role in stimulating productivity growth through 
channels that include technology differences among countries, knowledge spillovers, the 
transmission of ideas, and market expansion that lead to increasing returns to scale and/or 
Smithian economies of ￿fine specialization￿ (as opposed to Ricardian differences in 
factor proportions). In CGE analyses, the operational links between trade liberalization 
and total factor productivity growth are frequently based on the stylized trade-
productivity externalities described by de Melo and Robinson (1992). There is an export 
externality link between export growth and an increase in TFP within the sector. On the 
import side, imports of intermediate and capital goods are linked with sectoral TFP. 
Finally, an increase in aggregate exports leads to economy-wide increases in the 
efficiency of capital inputs.  
Although this modeling approach typically incorporates ad hoc assumptions about 
the parameters that describe trade-productivity links, there is a growing body of empirical 
literature that seeks to measure links between trade volumes and productivity. Coe, 
Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1997) estimated trade-productivity links for 77 developing 
countries, finding sizable spillover benefits of research and development in developing 
countries through exports of machinery and equipment to developed countries. They 
estimated that a one-percent increase in the import share of machinery and equipment to 31   
GDP results in a .3 percent increase in TFP. Frankel and Romer (1999) analyzed a 98-
country sample, controlling for capital inputs per worker and schooling. They found that 
a one-percentage point increase in the trade share of GDP increased the contribution of 
productivity to output by about two-percentage points.  
There remain many skeptics of the role of trade or openness per se in stimulating 
growth. Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999), for example, argue that the positive links between 
openness and income growth are greatly overstated and that the empirical work is suspect 
given the mixed quality of the data and problems related to measurement and empirical 
methodology.
29 Furthermore, most of the trade externalities are based on macro 
relationships between measures of openness and measures of income or productivity 
growth.
30  Instead of openness and trade expansion, Rodrik et al. (2002) argue for the 
primacy of institutions in explaining economic growth. They find that the effect of trade 
on income, after controlling for institutions and geography, is almost always 
insignificant, although it is positively related to effective institutions.
31 
Trade-productivity externalities have been a defining element of the new trade 
theory and regionalism, incorporating elements of new growth theory, and related 
empirical literature. Open questions remain for theoretical analysis of new regionalism. 
In addition to the need for stronger evidence concerning trade-productivity linkages in  
                                                 
29 For other critical reviews of the empirical testing of the relationship between trade and growth, see 
Edwards (1993), Temple (1999) and Baldwin (2003).  
30 There is a parallel literature on micro studies of the impact of openness on productivity, using firm-level 
data. See, for example, the survey by Evenson and Westphal (1995). There is also some work at the 
sectoral level that argues for links between sectoral TFP growth and trade performance (e.g., Nishimizu and 
Robinson, 1984).  
31 Of course, the emergence of good ￿institutions￿ might well be related to openness and is a potential 
source of productivity growth￿TFP potentially includes much more than technology.  32   
general, there is the potential for exploring and testing the applicability of new growth 
theory to agriculture. Analysis of the role of institutions, and how they determine the 
manner links are exploited, could make an important contribution to the literature on 
regionalism. The role of trade rules and institutions is another area that has yet to be fully 
incorporated into analysis of regionalism. In particular, the question remains open as to 
whether there remains room in the multilateral system for countries to exploit 
productivity links as we find out more about them, or perhaps whether future Asian tigers 
may lose critical opportunities because of current constraints on policies such as export 
subsidies.  
TRADE PRODUCTIVITY LINKS AND AGRICULTURE 
 
 Trade-productivity externalities are typically linked to manufacturing, although 
economy-wide capital productivity gains can benefit agriculture as well. In addition, 
agricultural exports can serve as a source of foreign exchange to finance increased 
imports of productivity-enhancing intermediate inputs and capital goods. In general, 
though, there is a gap in this literature regarding the potential for trade expansion to lead 
to technological change in agriculture, which could well be very important for the poorest 
developing countries.  
Some recent literature at the industry level suggests this potential. Haley (2003) 
has described structural change in the North American hog and poultry sectors following 
NAFTA. She argues that open borders are among the factors that have contributed to the 
evolution of the U.S. and Canadian hog industries into a single, integrated industry in 
which each country specializes in stages of hog production that best meet its economic 33   
resources and regulatory framework. These changes have helped the industry to reduce 
production costs and increase product quality. USDA (2002) analyzed the effects of 
North American integration on the retail and wholesale food supply chains. The increased 
volume of trade and the development of strategic alliances among North American firms 
are spurring a ￿virtuous cycle￿ of continued innovation and integration that is lowering 
costs, improving quality and achieving year-round supplies of produce. Reardon and 
Berdegeu (2002) summarize a series of studies on the rise of supermarkets in Latin 
America. They conclude that trade liberalization has served as a supply side factor 
contributing to the transformation of the food marketing chain. Liberalization has made it 
easier and cheaper to import food and non-food products (such as refrigerators), which 
leads to what they call economies of scope (the possibility for large stores to hold more 
inventory than small stores). In addition, drastic change in FDI regulations, some of them 
due to RTAs, has contributed to a surge of FDI into the retail food sector and the rapid 




Imperfect competition, game theory, and product differentiation are additional 
components of new trade theory that have been included in analysis of new regionalism. 
CGE models incorporating imperfect competition and economies of scale were developed 
to analyze the impact of NAFTA (Francois and Shiells, 1994). Winters (1997) develops a 
model with imperfect competition to analyze terms-of-trade effects of an RTA, 
particularly on non-RTA members. He argues that it is incorrect to compute changes in 
exports from the non-member countries to RTA countries and draw welfare conclusions. 34   
￿ROW exports are a very poor indicator of ROW welfare.￿ (p. 134). He develops a 
theoretical model to analyze the welfare impacts of an RTA on non-members and argues 
that they depend on changes in its terms of trade, levels of output, number of firms, 
existing trade restrictions and induced investment effects. His proposed analysis of price 
changes relies on new trade theory tools of imperfect competition and product 
differentiation.  
Winters and Chang (2000) and Chang and Winters (2002) apply Winters￿ (1997) 
theoretical model and examine the terms-of-trade effects of an RTA when there is 
Betrand competition between the RTA partner and the non-partner. They use detailed 
price data and estimate the price effects when an RTA reduces tariffs faced by one 
exporter. Winters and Chang (2000) consider Spain￿s accession to the EU. Analyzing 
data on the price of Spanish imports of finished manufactured goods from major OECD 
sources, they find that the preferred exporter will raise its pre-tariff price while the non-
member will reduce its pre-tariff price. For example, they find that a 1% fall in the tariff 
on EC sales to Spain could reduce U.S. export prices to Spain by 0.34%. Using similar 
techniques to analyze the terms-of-trade effects of Brazil￿s entry to MERCUSOR, Chang 
and Winters (2002) find that non-members￿ export prices to Brazil fell relative to their 
export prices of the same commodities to other markets. As nonmember countries, 
including the U.S., Chile, and European suppliers, were forced to compete with preferred 
MECOSUR exporters to Brazil, they experienced a terms of trade decline. For the U.S., 
this relationship was small, but statistically significant, for agricultural commodities.  
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LOBBYING AND SPECIAL INTERESTS 
 
Perhaps the broadest framework to explain the role of interest groups in shaping 
regionalism is the analytical model developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995). 
Building on Grossman and Helpman (1994), which explains policy formation as the 
outcome of lobbying and contribution competition among industries, they describe free 
trade negotiations as a process of providing a sufficient balance among countries￿ interest 
groups. Free trade areas are devised in order to ensure that each country will have a 
sufficient number of exporters that will benefit from the agreement and provide it with 
their political support. Grossman and Helpman argue that the need for political viability 
may ultimately contradict the social desirability of the agreement. Specifically, when 
export growth results from trade diversion, so that narrow producer interests can be 
served by the agreement at the expense of the diffuse group of taxpayers, the agreement 
will be welfare-reducing. Trade diversion enhances political viability, but makes it more 
likely that countries will craft trade-diverting agreements.  
In an application of the Grossman-Helpman (1994) model to the case of foreign 
lobbying, Kee et al. (2003) study the relationship between foreign lobbying and the GSP 
tariff preferences that the United States grants to Latin American countries. His results 
show very high returns to Latin American exporters￿ political contributions of above 50 
percent. The reason for these large returns is due to the relatively low weight given to 
social welfare in the U.S. government’s objective function relative to Latin American 
exporters’ lobbying contributions for tariff preferences.  
Baldwin￿s (1997) domino theory uses the role of interest groups in nonmember 
countries to makes a positive case for regionalism. He argues that trade and investment 36   
diversion within a trade pact will generate political economy forces in excluded nations 
to either accede to the pact￿if its membership is open or to create new trade pacts among 
themselves. This pressure will increase with the size of the trade pact. The momentum is 
created by asymmetric lobbying losers tend to lobby harder than winners. Exclusion from 
trade blocs will therefore tend to strengthen the hand of pro-liberalization forces that are 
adversely affected by trade or investment diversion. This sets in motion a process that 
causes bilateral trade barriers to fall like dominoes, regardless of the pace of progress in 
multilateral negotiations.  
However, Schiff and Winters (2003) have a more critical view of the domino 
theory and argue that it is unlikely to lead all the way to global free trade. They cite 
incentives for RTA members to limit entry and exploit terms-of-trade benefits against 
outsiders. They also summarize the empirical evidence on expansion in RTAs and find 
that the number of RTAs that have accepted new members is approximately equal to the 




The historical transition from old to new regionalism a transition from shallow to 
deep integration, and the partnering of developed and developing countries￿has been 
accompanied by developments in economic theory and empirical work in international 
trade. Old trade theory, based on the elegant Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) and 
Viner-Meade theoretical frameworks, provided a powerful set of tools for analyzing 
issues arising from both global trade liberalization and the formation of regional trade 
agreements involving liberalizing commodity trade within the RTA (e.g., a customs 37   
union or free trade agreement). As both global liberalization and regional trade 
agreements moved beyond commodity trade to incorporate additional elements deep 
versus shallow integration￿new theoretical analysis also followed. New trade theory, 
however, is much more eclectic than work in the earlier HOS and Viner-Meade 
frameworks, at least in part because the theory is less unified and coherent as would be 
expected of a new field.  
There is a significant body of work using the methods of old trade theory to 
analyze the impact of new regionalism. The old paradigm is well developed, well 
understood, and comfortable, providing a body of conventional wisdom that facilitates 
analysis. Much of this work, however, is unsatisfactory, focusing on a narrow range of 
forces at work and missing a lot of the action arising from integration that goes well 
beyond commodity trade flows. It is time to move beyond this work and incorporate 
elements of new trade theory in empirical and theoretical analysis of new RTAs.  
The state of knowledge concerning new regionalism is certainly in flux. There are 
many important hypotheses that are as yet highly tentative, calling for both theoretical 
and empirical work. A partial list includes: 
•  Given that new regionalism usually involves integrating developed and 
developing countries, what are the links between the formation of RTAs and 
successful development strategies in the developing countries?  
•  How do rules of origin in FTAs affect future multilateral reforms? Do they 
emphasize (exaggerate) the trade diversion effects of an FTA? Are they 
manageable administratively?  38   
•  What is the nature of trade productivity links, in both developed and 
developing countries? Are there differences in the nature of these links in 
developed and developing countries?  
•  Is there evidence of Smithian gains at the micro level? De we see finer 
specialization in production following the formation of an RTA? To what 
extent does an RTA (which guarantees access to partner markets) make finer 
specialization in production more feasible? 
•  Does deeper integration among partners contribute to productivity gains? At 
the micro level, is there more harmonization in production? Are there changes 
in FDI following the creation of RTAs?  
•  Finally, an issue much studied but not yet resolved, is the extent to which the 
formation of RTAs impedes or supports continued global trade liberalization.  
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ANNEX: ANALYTICAL TOOLS IN THE VINER-MEADE FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Trade creation, trade diversion and the terms-of-trade effects largely define the 
static welfare impacts of an RTA. Viner (1950) developed these concepts within a 
￿second best￿ theoretical framework in which countries form a customs union. Much of 
the welfare analysis also pertains to the formation of RTAs. Viner described the changes 
in the allocation of production and consumption following the union. To focus on trade-
creating and trade-diverting effects, consider first the case in which the RTA member, 
country A, is small relative to its RTA partner, country B, and the nonmember, country 
C￿the export supply curves from the partner and the rest of the world are perfectly 
elastic. Trade creation occurs when A￿s imports increase following the formation of an 
RTA. It corresponds to the production and consumption gains from additional imports at 
a lower domestic price￿A imports more from its lower-cost RTA partner, B, while its 
own higher-cost domestic production declines.  
Trade diversion occurs when RTA members￿ imports from partner countries 
replace imports from more efficient non-member countries, as a result of the RTA￿s tariff 
preferences. An RTA improves welfare for its members if the benefits of trade creation 
dominate the losses from trade diversion. In a partial equilibrium framework, the net 
welfare effect depends on the magnitude of the gains in consumer surplus resulting from 
a lower internal price and the loss of tariff revenue.  
One can construct the case in which an RTA is purely trade-diverting. Described 
as the ￿small union case,￿ assume that both partners are small relative to the rest of the 
world. Assume that Country A initially imports a good from both B, which has an 47   
inelastic export supply curve, and Country C, which is large and has an elastic export 
supply curve to Country A. Suppose Country A forms an RTA with Country B, and that 
Country B cannot supply all of Country A￿s import demand following the RTA. In this 
case, the domestic price of imports in Country A does not change; it is still at the price set 
by Country C. However, the share of imports changes as Country A buys more imports 
from Country B. Country B moves up its export supply curve until its tariff-free supply 
price in Country A equals the tariff-ridden price from Country C. Country A is worse off 
with the RTA, since its consumers still pay the same domestic price, and tariff revenue 
has been transferred to the partner through Country A￿s terms-of-trade loss against 
Country B. The larger the initial share of Country A￿s trade with its partner, the greater 
the welfare loss associated with the tariff revenue transfer.
32  
When countries are large enough to affect world market prices as a result of 
changes in domestic trade policies, there are terms-of-trade effects in addition to the 
welfare effects from trade creation and diversion. When the price of a country￿s export 
relative to its import increases, its terms of trade improve and there is an additional 
welfare gain. When there are terms-of-trade changes, even an RTA that is trade-diverting 
can result in a net welfare gain.
33  
                                                 
32 Grossman and Helpman (1995) make the argument against RTAs using a similar theoretical framework.. 
33 The case of terms-of-trade changes leading to welfare gains from trade-diverting RTAs is shown, using 
offer curves, by Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981), using the importer￿s utility, by Johnson (975) and using 
indifference curves by Lipsey (1957). 
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Mundell (1964) describes the changes in terms of each country￿s trade balance. 
He considers the case where Country A removes tariffs on Country B. Country A will 
import more from B and buy less from C and produce fewer home goods. Country B￿s 
exports increase and it experiences a trade surplus, while Country C experiences a trade 
deficit. The world price must adjust to offset the trade surplus in Country B and the trade 
deficit in Country C. For country B, the price of its export good relative to the price of its 
import good must increase to offset the initial trade surplus. Country B￿s terms of trade 
improve. The opposite price adjustment occurs in Country C which experiences a terms-
of-trade loss.  
The effect on country A is ambiguous: its terms of trade decline relative to B but 
improve relative to C. Furthermore, even a small country can experience terms-of-trade 
effects due to an RTA. As Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981) note, ￿When a (customs 
union) is being established, the terms of trade is a slippery concept; ￿ the assumption 
that A is very small, and is faced by a large B and C does not mean that terms of trade 
can be ignored, since B￿s agreement to cut tariffs will affects A￿s terms of trade.￿ (.p. 
706).  
Johnson (1960) identifies the following conditions for net welfare gains for RTA 
members, when there are terms-of-trade effects:  
•  A country is more likely to gain from the creation of tariffs resulting from a 
customs union the higher the initial level of its tariffs and the more elastic the 
partner￿s export supply curve.  49   
•  A country is less likely to lose from trade diversion the smaller are the initial 
differences in cost between the partner and the foreign sources of supply for 
goods which they both can produce, the more elastic is the partner supply of such 
goods, and the less elastic is the foreign supply of them. 
•  A country is more likely to gain on its terms of trade with the foreign country the 
more inelastic s the foreign export supply to and the more inelastic the foreign 
demand for its exports.  
Terms-of-trade effects result from either large country assumptions or models of 
trade with differentiated products, which gives even small countries a degree of market 
power.
34 In either case, when tariff elimination increases a member￿s demand for its RTA 
partner￿s good, its drives up the partner￿s supply price and the member￿s within-union 
terms of trade will deteriorate. Presumably, this loss could be offset by similar 
concessions in the partner country.  
Most analysts seem to agree that countries are not primarily motivated by terms-
of-trade impacts when considering RTA membership. However, Bagwell and Staiger 
(1999) argue for the primacy of terms-of-trade objectives. In their model of a world in 
which tariffs are set uncooperatively, unilateral reform leads to terms-of-trade losses if 
demand for, and the world price of the import rise. So, countries pursue regionalism in 
order to allow tariffs to be reduced without the terms-of-trade externality. Wonnacott and 
                                                 
34 Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, which are often used to empirically estimate the effects 
of RTAs, typically assume that products are differentiated by country of origin. In this framework, even 
small countries have a degree of market power. Schiff and Winters (2003) assert that CGE models are 
therefore biased towards finding benefits from RTAs. This characterization is incorrect because it focuses 
only on the terms-of-trade gains members experience at the expense of non-members. One needs to 
consider the changes in both intra-union terms of trade and terms of trade with the non-union countries, 
which is captured in CGE models. . 50   
Wonnacot (1981) make a similar point￿unilateral trade liberalization does not allow the 
liberalizing country the benefit of accessing another country￿s market at its domestic 
price. In effect, unilateral trade liberalization leads to ￿missing tariff revenue.￿ A customs 
union provides incentives for participants because partners reciprocate and open their 
markets.  
Welfare analysis based on trade creation, diversion, and terms-of-trade changes 
by sector use a partial equilibrium framework. A more appropriate, general equilibrium 
measure would consider change in real GDP, real absorption or a utility based measure 
such as equivalent or compensating variation. Kowalczk (2000) describes a general 
equilibrium measure from the literature on the theory of tariffs. He notes that the change 
in a country￿s real income (assuming balanced trade) can be decomposed into a terms-of-
trade effect and a volume of trade effect. Harrison et al. (1993) describe another general 
equilibrium measure in which they decompose a nation￿s welfare into changes in 
producer surplus, consumer surplus, and the change in tariff revenue.  
Kose and Reisman (2000) evaluate the welfare effects of an RTA using a stylized 
multi-country general equilibrium model in which tariffs are determined endogenously. 
They identify the terms of trade and the trade volume effects of unilateral tariff reform, a 
free trade area and a customs union. They find that a significant fraction of the welfare 
changes can be explained by the volume of trade effect. Using a more detailed multi-
country computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, Hamilton and Whalley (1985) 
evaluate the effects of RTAs on global and regional trade patterns and welfare. They 
consider a series of different types of possible (although not necessarily proposed) 
bilateral RTAs involving the U.S. and other regional groupings to identify what 51   
contributes to welfare changes. They find that trade creation and trade diversion issues, 
which are emphasized in the theoretical literature, are not the important factors 
determining the gains or losses from an RTA. Instead, what matters is:  
•  Whether the initial levels of protection are symmetric. 
•  Relative sizes of the regions. 
•  The pattern of trade between participating and non-participating regions. 
Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981) also note that the emphasis on trade creation 
and diversion in trade theory is not relevant for empirical analysis:  
￿The standard assumption, that A is very small compared to C (the non-
RTA partner), is not so reasonable as it seems at first glance; in particular, 
it is not nearly so reasonable in a many-good world as it seems in the 
common two- and three-good models of trade theory. In fact, no outside 
country or group of outside countries is likely to be predominant in the 
pricing of all goods.￿(p. 706).   52
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